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The  distribution  of  incomes  resulting  from  the  remu-
neration of labour and capital in the production process is 
often referred to by the term primary income distribution. 
It is influenced partly by factors for which individuals are 
not responsible, such as their talents or their social back-
ground, and by wealth inequality. Moreover, there are cer-
tain social risks, such as illness, old age or unemployment, 
which prevent a substantial proportion of the population 
from participating in the labour market and thus acquiring 
an income. There is a social consensus endorsing partial 
compensation  for  the  impact  of  these  factors  on  the 
distribution of income, and pursuit of what could be con-
sidered a fairer distribution of income. Reducing inequality 
in the distribution of primary income and wealth – and at 
the same time combating poverty – is therefore one of the 
government’s principal tasks (Musgrave, 199). How far 
the government should go in that redistribution depends 
on the value judgments of society.
The government can adjust the distribution of income, or 
more  generally  the  distribution  of  well-being,  in  various 
ways. It can provide social benefits, e.g. in the form of pen-
sions, invalidity benefits and unemployment benefits. It can 
produce or purchase goods and services such as education 
and health care, public transport or social housing, and 
make them available to the population free of charge or at 
low cost. It can oblige enterprises to charge social rates, as 
in the case of electricity or fixed telephony. However, the 
government can also make use of taxes and social contri-
butions for the purpose of its redistribution policy.
Typical for redistribution via taxes and social contributions 
– leaving aside the use of the resources generated – is 
that nobody’s income improves. The redistributive char-
acter lies in the diversity of the amounts of the individual 
contributions, so that these compulsory levies modify the 
differences in terms of disposable income. In this connec-
tion, reference is often made to the principle of ”con-
tributive capacity” whereby everyone should contribute 
to the financing of public spending in accordance with 
their  economic  capacity.  Specific  criteria  for  measuring 
an individual’s economic capacity are the level of income, 
size of assets, scale and type of consumption or the effort 
required  to  obtain  income  or  assets.  This  contributive 
capacity principle therefore amounts to ensuring that “the 
strongest shoulders bear the heaviest burdens”.
Apart from the aim of fairness, there are other considera-
tions involved in the decision to levy taxes and social secu-
rity contributions. A central idea of the theory of optimal 
taxation is that these levies disrupt the efficiency of the 
market because of their effect on the allocation of the fac-
tors of production and on the composition of spending  (1). 
To limit the loss of efficiency due to the market distortion, 
*  In preparing this article, the authors were fortunate to benefit from calculations 
made by Christian Valenduc (FPS Finance, Research and Documentation 
Department). The international comparison has to a large extent been based on 
information made available by Gerlinde Verbist (University of Antwerp, Centre 
for Social Policy Herman Deleeck). The authors would like to thank them both for 
their helpful collaboration.
(1)  According to this theory, taxes and social security contributions are considered 
to be essentially negative for general economic performance because they 
disrupt the market mechanism and distort decisions on working, investment, 
consumption and saving, and inhibit economic initiative. Conversely, certain 
types of public spending (infrastructure, education, research & development, 
etc.) enhance the productivity of the economy and are therefore essential 
to the achievement of satisfactory economic growth. On the basis of these 
considerations, the prevailing consensus is that the favourable economic effects 
of public spending compensate for the adverse effect of taxes when that 
spending remains below a certain level and is clearly productive.66
(1)  Owing to the lack of relevant information, the article does not consider the effect 
of taxes on assets and capital incomes.
the government should raise its finance by low, uniform 
rates of tax levied on the broadest possible base, which 
should preferably be inelastic. The disruption of the effi-
cient allocation of the production factors is thus kept to a 
minimum. A tax in the form of a fixed amount per person, 
regardless of income, assets or expenditure, would there-
fore be optimal from the point of view of efficiency. This 
shows that efficiency considerations are sometimes dif-
ficult to reconcile with the aim of equitable taxation.
The government also has to take account of the practical 
constraints which may restrict its freedom of action. Thus, 
international agreements are necessary in order to avoid 
unfair fiscal competition, particularly as regards sources 
of taxation such as assets, which may be highly mobile. 
The effort to achieve the taxation and income distribu-
tion desired by society may also be hampered if the tax 
rules are not properly respected, e.g. in the case of tax 
evasion.
This article aims to explain the redistributive character of 
taxes and social security contributions in Belgium, and to 
demonstrate the mechanisms behind that redistribution. 
The article begins by presenting the measures of inequal-
ity  and  redistribution.  Next,  it  compares  the  degree  of 
redistribution  in  Belgium  with  that  seen  in  the  other 
European Union countries, showing the level of redistri-
bution  by  means  of  taxes,  social  security  contributions 
and  social  benefits.  It  then  describes  in  succession  the 
redistributive mechanisms of personal income tax, social 
security contributions and indirect taxes  (1). Finally, it sum-
marises the main conclusions.
1.    Measures of income inequality and 
redistribution
1.1  Measures of income inequality
The  inequality  of  the  income  distribution  is  often  rep-
resented graphically in the form of the so-called Lorenz 
curve.  Individuals  or  households  are  ranked  in  ascend-
ing order of income, and the curve plots the cumulative 
number of individuals or households against their cumu-
lative share of income. In a situation in which everyone 
has  the  same  income,  the  Lorenz  curve  coincides  with 
the bisector or 4° line, whereas a Lorenz curve which is 
aligned with the axes corresponds to a situation in which 
a single person or household receives all the income.
A frequently used aggregate measure of the inequality 
of the income distribution is the Gini coefficient, which is 
closely connected with the Lorenz curve. This coefficient 
is calculated by taking the area between the Lorenz curve 
and the 4° line and dividing it by the total area below 
the  4°  line.  It  always  has  a  value  between  0  and  1. 
The higher the Gini coefficient, the greater the income 
inequality. The value 0 corresponds to a totally even dis-
tribution, where as the value 1 corresponds to an income 
distribution where a single person receives all the income. 
However, one drawback of this measure is that the same 
Gini coefficient can represent different types of income 
distribution.  The  Gini  coefficient  can  also  be  used  to 
measure the inequality of the tax distribution.
1.2  Measures of income redistribution
Income redistribution means the reduction of inequalities 
in the distribution of income. The degree of redistribution 
is measured by the difference between income inequality 
before tax (and social security contributions and benefits) 
and income inequality after tax (and social security con-
tributions and benefits). In graph form, redistribution is 
shown by the Lorenz curve moving closer to the 4° line.
The degree of redistribution (R) is defined as the differ-
ence  between  the  Gini  coefficient  before  the  income 
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CHART 1  THE LORENZ CURVE AND THE GINI 




































Gini coefficient  =
area below
the 45° line
(1)  Households are ranked in ascending income order.67
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R = Gb – Ga
It can be shown that the redistributive character of the 
tax (R) depends partly on the progressiveness of the tax 
(P) and partly on the average rate of the tax (t) via the 




( ) × P
The  progressiveness  of  a  tax  represents  the  degree  to 
which  the  tax  differs  from  a  proportional  tax  which 
would generate the same revenue. A progressive tax has 
a rising average rate. In a system of progressive taxation, 
the  proportion  of  taxes  payable  by  the  lower  (higher) 
income groups is thus lower (higher) than their share of 
the income. If the opposite is true, it is called a system of 
degressive (or regressive) taxation.
The index of progressiveness is defined as the difference 
between the Gini coefficient of the tax distribution (C) 
and  the  Gini  coefficient  of  income  distribution  before 
taxes.  (2)
P = C – Gb
Apart from the Gini coefficient used here, the literature 
proposes various other ways of measuring inequality and 
redistribution. As the correlation between these various 
measures is sometimes low, they may lead to different 
conclusions. The results should therefore be interpreted 
with caution.
2.    Income redistribution in Belgium in a 
European perspective  (3)
As already mentioned, the inequality of the primary dis-
tribution of income is the inequality resulting from the 
remuneration of the production factors. In other words, it 
is the income inequality before the collection of any social 
benefits and before payment of taxes and social contribu-
tions  (4). According to EUROMOD  (), Belgium – with a Gini 
coefficient of 0.46 in 1998 – had the fourth lowest rate 
of primary income inequality in the EU-1. Only Denmark, 
Austria and – in particular – the Netherlands had a lower 
primary  inequality.  Belgium  is  thus  below  the  EU-1 
average,  for  which  the  Gini  coefficient  was  0.48.  The 
highest inequality in the primary distribution of income 
was recorded in southern Europe (Portugal, Italy, Greece 
and Spain) and in the Anglo-Saxon countries (Ireland and   
the UK).
Social  benefits,  social  security  contributions  and  direct 
taxes on income  (6) bring about a significant reduction of 
income  inequality  in  all  the  EU-1  countries.  However, 
there are large differences between countries. The small-
est inequality reduction occurs in the southern European 
countries, excluding Spain. The Gini coefficient also shows 
a relatively small decline in the Netherlands, but the ini-
tial inequality there is significantly less than in the other 
European countries. In Belgium, the inequality reduction 
– the Gini coefficient falls by 0.21 – exceeds the average 
for the EU-1, where the (unweighted) average reduction 
comes to 0.19 (the weighted average reduction comes 
to 0.17). Only Finland, Denmark and Luxembourg have 
a higher degree of redistribution. Belgium is thus among 
the countries with relatively low primary income inequality 
and a high degree of redistribution.
The breakdown  (7) of the redistribution between social ben-
efits and income taxes shows that, in all countries, social 
benefits account for the bulk of the income redistribu-
tion. That is not surprising since social benefits are largely 
intended  for  persons  with  little  or  no  primary  income. 
However, in the majority of countries, taxes on income 
account for a considerable part of the redistribution. On 
average, those taxes reduce the Gini coefficient by 0.07. 
In Belgium, taxes and social security contributions actually 
reduce the Gini coefficient by 0.09. After Luxembourg, 
Belgium has the highest level of redistribution via income 
taxes in the EU-1.
As already stated, the degree of redistribution via income 
taxes is determined by the average rate and the progres-
siveness of those taxes. In Belgium, the average rate of 
taxes on income is higher than in the EU-1. However, it is 
primarily the relatively high progressiveness of those taxes 
in Belgium that generates the higher degree of redistribu-
tion. As the progressiveness of the personal income tax in 
Belgium is more or less the same as the EU-1 average, 
(1)  However, this breakdown is possible only if the ranking of households according 
to their income is not changed by taxation.
(2)  This index of progressiveness was calculated by N.C. Kakwani (1977) and is 
named after him.
(3)  This analysis is based on Immervoll (200) and Verbist (2004).
(4)  The government also exerts influence on primary income distribution, notably by 
imposing minimum wages and by public sector employment.
()  EUROMOD was developed under the direction of Professor H. Sutherland at 
Essex University (United Kingdom). It is a microsimulation model which, on the 
basis of income data taken from socioeconomic surveys, simulates the impact of 
income taxes and social benefits on income distribution. In the case of Belgium, 
EUROMOD is based on the Panel Survey on Belgian Households which relates 
to incomes in 1998. The advantage of the microsimulation model is that the 
methods are harmonised – permitting comparisons between the various EU-1 
countries - and it also takes account of the impact of taxes and social benefits. 
However, such simulation models do have their limitations, owing to the reliability 
of the sample and the absence of information on the tax allowances granted for 
certain expenditure.
(6)  Immervoll (200) defined these as personal income tax, other taxes on capital 
incomes and local taxes.
(7)  Immervoll (200) rightly demonstrated that a breakdown of the overall 
redistribution according to the various instruments cannot be accurate. In order 
to illustrate the importance of the different factors, an approximative division 
is made, by which the reduction of each instrument separately is applied in 
proportion to the total redistribution.68
it  is  essentially  the  progressiveness  of  social  security 
contributions that accounts for this outcome. Except in 
Belgium, the United Kingdom, Ireland and Finland, social 
security contributions in the EU-1 are practically propor-
tional, or even degressive in some cases. In Belgium the 
main reason is that no social security contributions are 
payable on social benefits, or only limited contributions 
on benefits beyond a certain level  (1).
As a result of the relatively low level of primary income 
inequality and the high degree of redistribution due to 
social  benefits  and  taxes  on  income,  the  inequality  of 
the secondary distribution of income in Belgium is rela-
tively low in comparison with the majority of the EU-1 
countries.  Only  Finland,  Denmark  and  Austria  have  a 
lower level of secondary income inequality. After social 
benefits  and  taxes  on  income,  the  southern  European 
countries and the Anglo-Saxon countries still record the 
highest level of inequality. The countries with the greatest 
inequality generally record the highest poverty rate. That 
is not surprising since that rate is often measured by the 
percentage of the population whose income is less than 
60  p.c.  of  the  standardised  median  income  (Atkinson, 
2002).  The  more  unequal  the  distribution  of  incomes, 
the greater the risk of a larger number of persons falling 
below this 60 p.c. mark.
3.    The redistributive character of 
personal income tax
This chapter deals with the redistributive character of per-
sonal income tax in Belgium, explaining the main mecha-
nisms involved in that redistribution. Two particular points 
will be discussed in more detail, namely the redistributive 
aspects of the various personal income tax allowances and 
the personal income tax reform passed in 2001.
The analysis is based on the statistics relating to personal 
income tax returns. In addition, a number of data were 
obtained from the SIRe microsimulation model developed 
by the Research and Documentation Department of the 
FPS Finance. The data taken from the tax returns have the 
advantage of being very detailed and very accurate ; on 
the other hand, they only concern people who submit a 
tax return. It is estimated that between 10 and 1 p.c. of 
the population do not submit a tax return because their 
income is too low (Pittevils and Timmermans, 199).
(1)  In the United Kingdom and Ireland, there are maximum and minimum income 
thresholds for social security contributions, and the progressive effect of the 
minimum thresholds is greater than the degressive effect of the maximum 
thresholds. In Finland, there is a supplementary social security contribution in the 

































































































































CHART 2  INCOME INEQUALITY AND REDISTRIBUTION IN 
THE EU-15
  (1998, unless otherwise stated)
Sources : EC, Immervoll (2005).
(1)  Percentage of the population whose income equivalent is less than 60 p.c. of the 
median income.
Effect of taxes
Effect of social security contributions
Effect of social benefits
Poverty rate (1)
(right-hand scale, percentages, 2001)
PRIMARY INCOME DISTRIBUTION 
INEQUALITY
(Gini coefficients) 
INFLUENCE OF INCOME TAXES AND SOCIAL BENEFITS 
ON INCOME DISTRIBUTION
(Reduction in Gini coefficients) 
INCOME INEQUALITY AFTER REDISTRIBUTION 
AND POVERTY RATE (1)
Inequality after social benefits 
and income taxes
(left-hand scale, Gini coefficients)69
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3.1    Overall view of the redistributive effect of 
personal income tax
After  social  security  contributions,  personal  income  tax 
is the principal source of government revenue. The tax is 
concentrated primarily on the highest income deciles. On 
their 2002 income (2003 tax year), the 20 p.c. of house-
holds with the lowest incomes paid 0.4 p.c. of the total 
personal income tax, whereas they received  p.c. of the 
total amount of that income. The 20 p.c. of households 
with the highest net disposable incomes paid 61.7 p.c.   
of the total personal income tax, while receiving 46. p.c.   
of  the  total  income  before  tax.  Personal  income  tax  is 
clearly  distributed  more  unevenly  between  the  income 
groups than the pre-tax incomes, so that the after tax 
incomes are distributed more equally. While the 0 p.c. 
of  households  with  the  lowest  net  disposable  incomes 
receive altogether 22.8 p.c. of those pre-tax incomes, they 
receive 27.8 p.c. of the total incomes after tax.
The  redistributive  character  of  personal  income  tax 
increased between 196 and 2002, primarily during the 
first part of that period. This was due to divergent trends 
in  the  average  rate  and  progressiveness.  Up  to  197, 
the redistributive effect of personal income tax became 
much  stronger  as  a  result  of  tax  rises  which  greatly 
increased the average rate, while at the same time exert-
ing a negative effect on the progressiveness of personal 
income tax. The personal income tax reform implemented 
from the 1983 tax year, modifying the fiscal treatment of 
replacement incomes, caused a break in the series. The 
Table  1	 Personal income tax in Belgium	Per income decile












1 7,188 1.3 0.0 1.8 0.6
2 10,738 3.7 0.4 4.9 2.7
3 13,080 4.8 1.1 6.1 5.8
4 15,863 5.9 2.6 7.0 11.7
5 18,914 7.1 4.6 7.9 17.0
6 22,292 8.3 7.0 8.8 21.7
7 26,958 9.9 9.4 10.1 24.7
8 34,460 12.4 13.1 12.1 27.7
9 47,485 16.3 19.4 15.3 30.9
10 – 30.2 42.4 25.9 36.6
Source: FPS Economy.


















































































CHART 3  REDISTRIBUTIVE EFFECT OF PERSONAL 
INCOME TAX (1)
Sources : FPS Economy, FPS Finance.
(1)  Until 1975, the data are only available every two years.
Modification to the tax system 
of social benefits (1982)
Personal income tax 
reform (1989)
Progressiveness index (left-hand scale)
Average rate (left-hand scale)
Redistribution (difference in Gini coefficients)
(right-hand scale)
  abatements (deductions from taxable income) for replace-
ment incomes were replaced by tax credits (tax deduc-
tions) so that replacement incomes were henceforward 
included in taxable income without any increase in the 70
tax on those incomes  (1). The main effect of the personal 
income tax reform of 7 December 1988, which came into 
force in 1989, was to sharply reduce the levies on earned 
income  (2). The average rate of personal income tax thus 
declined. Since the progressiveness also declined slightly, 
that reform reduced the redistributive character of per-
sonal income tax.
During the 1990s the progressiveness of personal income 
tax remained fairly stable, but as a result of the rise in 
the  average  rate  –  brought  about  in  particular  by  the 
introduction  of  the  complementary  crisis  contribution, 
the non-indexation of the tax scales and the automatic 
increase in the tax burden resulting from the real increase 
in  incomes  –  the  redistributive  character  of  personal 
income tax increased. Between 2000 and 2002, the phas-
ing out of the complementary crisis contribution resulted 






























































CHART 4  MARGINAL RATES OF PERSONAL 
INCOME TAX
 (1) (2)
  (2004, percentages)
Sources : OECD, NBB.
(1)  For single persons with no children, having earned income only.
(2)  The standard allowances for professional expenses and various tax credits 
are taken into account; the tax-free allowance is regarded as a zero rate 
of tax.
(3)  Including local additional centimes on personal income tax, assumed to be levied 













































CHART 5  COMPARISON OF PERSONAL INCOME TAX BETWEEN LABOUR INCOMES AND REPLACEMENT INCOMES




AVERAGE RATE OF PERSONAL INCOME TAX IN RELATION 





SHARE OF INCOME CATEGORIES (2002)
(percentages)
Income decile Income decile
(1)  Until the introduction of the law of  January 1976, unemployment benefits, 
sickness and disability benefits and the compensation paid for occupational 
diseases and industrial accidents were totally tax free, while old age pensions and 
survivors’ pensions were only taxable in certain cases. From the 1977 tax year 
onwards, all replacement incomes were, in principle, included in the tax base. 
This measure was accompanied by the introduction of abatements.
(2)  The changes introduced by this reform included the total abandonment of the 
aggregation of earned incomes (previously, the earned incomes of spouses had 
been added together and were jointly subject to the progressive rates of personal 
income tax), the introduction of the dependent spouse allowance for single 
income households, and the tax-free allowance (increased for dependent adults 
and children), and it adjusted the marginal rates of tax, cutting the highest rate 
from 70.8 p.c. to  p.c.71
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3.2    The average rate and progressiveness of 
personal income tax
The average rate of personal income tax was 26 p.c. in the 
2003 tax year. The average rate per income decile clearly 
shows that personal income tax is highly progressive in 
Belgium. While the average rate of tax on the first income 
decile is 0.6 p.c., it increases to 36.6 p.c. for the tenth 
decile. Up to and including the seventh income decile, the 
average rate is below the average for all tax returns.
There  are  three  main  factors  responsible  for  the  sharp 
increase  in  the  tax  rate  per  decile.  First,  there  are  the 
marginal rates of tax applicable to the income brackets. 
(1)  The implicit average rate of tax for pensioners in the highest decile is actually 
higher, among other things because these pensioners have fewer dependent 
children.
These rise from 2 p.c. for the lowest income bracket to 
0  p.c.  for  the  highest  (excluding  supplementary  local 
income taxes). Next, owing to the tax-free allowance, tax-
able income is entirely exempt from personal income tax 
up to a certain threshold. The tax-free allowance there-
fore in fact corresponds to a zero rate on the first part of 
incomes. Finally, the tax credits granted on replacement 
incomes such as pensions, sickness and invalidity benefits 
and unemployment benefits augment the progressiveness 
of personal income tax. The tax credits are subject to vari-
ous restrictions, and are reduced as incomes increase. If 
a household is living entirely on social benefits, the tax 
reductions  often  mean  that  no  personal  income  tax  is 
payable.
Around three-quarters of the progressiveness of personal 
income tax is due to the tax scales associated with the tax-
free allowance. The tax credits for replacement incomes 
contributes about a quarter to the progressiveness index. 
A number of other factors, such as the additional cen-
times on personal income tax levied by local authorities, 
exert a weak negative effect overall on the progressive-
ness of personal income tax (Valenduc, 200).
Comparison of the rates of personal income tax charged 
in  Belgium  on  2004  incomes  (including  the  tax-free 
allowance  and  the  supplementary  local  income  taxes) 
with those applicable in neighbouring countries reveals 
that, owing to the tax-free allowance, the situation for 
the lowest income bracket in Belgium is more or less the 
same. As income increases, however, the marginal rate is 
significantly higher in Belgium. The 0 p.c. rate, applicable 
to the highest tax bracket, is similar to that charged in 
neighbouring countries ; however, it is higher if the local 
additional centimes on personal income tax are taken into 
account.
For  the  various  income  deciles,  the  tax  reduction  for 
replacement incomes leads to a wide variation in the tax 
rate according to whether the income is obtained solely 
from labour or also includes pensions or unemployment 
benefits (Verbist, 200). In the case of the higher income 
deciles,  this  difference  disappears,  if  all  or  part  of  the 
income  consists  of  pensions  (1).  The  tax  reductions  for 
replacement incomes make a major contribution to pro-
gressiveness, not only because the tax rate on the benefits 
increases with each income decile, but also because the 
percentage  of  total  income  represented  by  benefits  is 































































































































PERSONAL INCOME TAX 
(additional centimes)
WITHHOLDING TAX ON IMMOVABLE PROPERTY 
(additional centimes)
Average net taxable income
CHART 6  DEGRESSIVITY OF LOCAL INCOME TAXES
  (2002 incomes, 2003 tax year)
Sources : FPS Economy, FPS Finance.72
As already stated, the additional tax levied by local author-
ities has a negative influence on the progressiveness of 
the  personal  income  tax.  The  wealthiest  municipalities 
– on the basis of the average net taxable incomes stated 
in  the  personal  income  tax  returns  per  municipality  –   
charge a lower supplementary rate than the municipali-
ties where the average income of the population is lower. 
This degressivity of personal income tax at local level also 
appears to apply in respect of the additional centimes on 
the withholding tax on immovable property.
3.3    The redistributive aspects of the tax allowances
Certain types of household spending give rise to a tax 
advantage  in  regard  to  personal  income  tax.  In  2002, 
these  tax  allowances  totalled  6  p.c.  of  the  personal 
income tax collected, or 0.7 p.c. of GDP. From the point 
of view of the budget, the most important ones concern 
support for the construction, renovation or purchase of 
a  house.  The  tax  allowance  for  capital  repayments  on 
mortgage loans and the associated tax allowance for life 
insurance covering these mortgage debts in themselves 
already account for 3.2 p.c. of personal income tax.
The primary concern in introducing tax allowances is not 
so  much  the  redistribution  of  income  as  the  provision 
of  incentives  encouraging  a  particular  type  of  behav-
iour  or  spending.  That  emerges  clearly  from  a  com-
parison between the inequality of tax allowances and the 
  inequality of incomes before personal income tax. In all 
cases, the inequality of tax allowances is greater than the 
inequality of pre-tax incomes. This means that, in relative 
terms, it is the higher incomes that benefit most from the 
tax reductions.
There are substantial variations in inequality between the 
different tax allowances. The allowance granted for group 
insurance and that granted for the purchase of employ-
er’s shares are particularly unequal in their distribution  (1). 
The two highest income deciles represent around 8 p.c. 
of  the  budgetary  cost  of  these  measures.  Conversely, 
however, the inequality of other tax expenditures, such 
as those associated with owner-occupied housing, pen-
sion  savings,  life  insurance,  donations  and  LEA  service 
vouchers is less than that of personal income tax. This 
means that if these tax reductions were abolished and 
offset by an equivalent proportional reduction in the rates 
of personal income tax – and the average rate therefore 
remained constant – that would diminish the redistribu-
tive character of personal income tax.
The inequality of the distribution of tax allowances is influ-
enced  by  the  number  of  households  per  income  decile 
claiming these allowances. The average amount claimed 
per household may also vary from one decile to another. 
In this context, potential restrictions on the amount of the 
(1)  The allowance granted for the purchase of employer’s shares is incompatible with 
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CHART 7  INEQUALITY OF TAX ALLOWANCES
  (2002 incomes, 2003 tax year, Gini coefficients)
Source : FPS Finance.
(1)  Other than linked to mortgage loans.
(2)  Inequality of personal income tax taking into account the tax allowances.
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tax allowances are, of course, important. Moreover, the tax 
advantage gained also depends on the rate of tax applica-
ble to the amount deducted. As many of the deductions 
are subject to the marginal rate or what is known as the 
improved average rate, that also increases the inequality in 
the distribution of tax allowances, although this last effect 
is significantly less than the two effects mentioned earlier. 
However,  the  importance  of  these  factors  varies  widely 
between the various tax allowances.
The proportion of households claiming the allowances for 
mortgage repayments, mortgage interest charges, pension 
savings and group insurance increases the higher the net 
disposable  income.  Thus,  over  two-thirds  of  the  highest 
income groups make use of the tax allowance for mortgage 
repayments, whereas very few in the lowest income groups 
do so. As regards the average amount deducted, there are 
noticeable differences between the tax allowances. In the 
case of mortgage interest charges, almost everyone claims 
the  maximum  allowance.  Conversely,  where  mortgage 
repayments are concerned, the average amount increases 
slightly as income rises  (1). The amount deductible for pen-
sion savings is limited, and the average allowance claimed 
is in the region of the maximum for all income groups. 
Conversely, there is virtually no limit on the average amount 
claimed in respect of group insurance  (2), and it is significantly 
more in the highest income groups than in the lower ones.
(1)  Under the new tax allowance for home owners which came into effect in 200 
and will gradually become more important, the average amount per income 
decile will be more uniform.
(2)  The only restriction is that the annuity provided by the group insurance must not 
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CHART 8  DISTRIBUTION OF TAX ALLOWANCES PER INCOME PERCENTILE (1)
  (2002 incomes, 2003 tax year)
Source : FPS Finance.
(1)  Net taxable income.74
3.4    The redistributive aspects of the 2001 personal 
income tax reform
The personal income tax reform introduced by the law 
of 10 August 2001 and phased in over several years was 
based on four aims. The first aim was to reduce the tax 
burden on labour incomes. The second concerned neu-
trality vis-à-vis forms of cohabitation. The third and fourth 
aims, far less important for the budget than the first two, 
concerned taking greater account of dependent children 
and encouraging environment-friendly behaviour.
Overall, this tax reform had hardly any impact on the 
redistributive  character  of  personal  income  tax.  The 
reform lowered the average tax rate from 26 to 23 p.c., 
but this was offset by increased progressiveness. Even 
if the households which do not submit any tax return 
– and therefore do not benefit from the tax reform – are 
taken  into  account,  the  personal  income  tax  reform 
caused only a negligible reduction in the redistributive 
character of personal income tax (Cantillon, 2003).
The  tax  advantage  in  relation  to  disposable  income 
varies between income deciles. In the first income decile, 
the tax advantage represents just under 3. p.c. of net 
taxable  income.  After  the  first  income  decile,  the  tax 
advantage declines as a result of the reduced size of the 
tax  credit  for  low  earned  incomes,  without  the  other 
measures having any significant effects for these income 
groups.  From  the  fourth  decile  onwards,  the  widen-
ing of the tax brackets and the measures in favour of 
neutrality regarding forms of cohabitation increase the 
tax advantage. The lowering of the top marginal rates 
primarily improves the situation for the upper deciles. 
However, these income groups have largely reached the 
maximum  absolute  advantage  conferred  by  the  other 
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CHART 9  AVERAGE ADVANTAGE OF THE 2001 PERSONAL 
INCOME TAX REFORM 
  (simulation based on 2002 incomes, 2003 tax year)
Sources : FPS Finance, NBB.
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CHART 10  EFFECT OF THE 2001 PERSONAL INCOME TAX REFORM ON THE PROGRESSIVENESS OF THE TAX
  (2002 incomes, 2003 tax year)
Source : FPS Finance.
(1)  This is the value of the personal income tax progressiveness index before the 2001 reform.7
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If the effect of this personal income tax reform is viewed 
in relation to the taxes paid, it is evident that the reform 
is making the tax significantly more progressive. The tax 
reform particularly reduces the taxes paid by the lowest 
income groups. The average reduction in tax is 74 p.c.   
for the first decile, dropping to around 6 p.c. for the high-
est income decile.
As  already  mentioned,  this  tax  reform  increased  the 
progressiveness  of  personal  income  tax.  However,  that 
is the overall outcome of all the measures. Examination 
of each measure’s impact on progressiveness reveals that 
the  main  factors  increasing  progressiveness  were  the 
introduction of the tax credit for low earned incomes and 
the increase in the rates of the standard allowances for 
professional  expenses.  The  widening  of  the  intermedi-
ate tax brackets, individualisation of the tax credits for 
replacement incomes, and the measures aimed at taking 
greater account of the cost of children also increase that 
progressiveness. Conversely, the abolition of the highest 
marginal rates is clearly a measure favouring individuals 
or  households  with  a  high  income.  The  alignment  of 
the tax-free allowance for married persons with that for 
cohabitants exerts also a negative effect on the progres-
siveness of personal income tax, since there are relatively 
more married couples in the higher income groups.
It should be noted that the tax credit granted to taxpay-
ers on low earned incomes in 2004 was abolished for 
employees but retained for self-employed persons. In the 
case of employees, this tax credit was replaced from 200 
onwards by extending the reduced rate of personal social 
security contributions in the form of the so-called work 
bonus. While this measure reduces the redistributive char-
acter of personal income tax, it augments it of personal 
social security contributions.
4.    The redistributive character of social 
security contributions
In Belgium as in the other EU-1 Member States, income 
redistribution under the social security system takes place 
mainly  via  social  benefits.  Social  contributions  are  not 
generally regarded as levies contributing to redistribution. 
However, the international comparison presented earlier 
shows that, in Belgium, the personal social contributions  (1) 
do increase redistribution to a limited extent.
Although the personal contributions are, in principle, pro-
portional to wages, since a uniform rate of 13.07 p.c.  (2)   
is applied to all income levels (since the abolition of the 
wage  ceilings  in  1982),  there  are  mechanisms  which 
cause social contributions to be progressive. These include 
the special social security contribution and the reductions 
in contributions for low wage earners, that were reformed 
and extended in 200 by the introduction of the work 
bonus.
The fact that only low contributions, if any, are levied on 
various social benefits also contributes to the progressive-
ness of the contributions. Thus, pensions are subject to a 
solidarity contribution of up to 2 p.c. on the highest pen-
sions, while there is a contribution of 3. p.c. levied for 
health care. A 3. p.c. pension contribution is also levied 
on  incapacity  benefits  and  on  collectively  agreed  early 
retirement allowances. In addition, these social contribu-
tions apply only if the benefits exceed a certain amount. 
No  social  contributions  are  levied  on  unemployment 
benefits. As already mentioned, the recipients of social 
benefits belong to the lower income deciles. The share of 
earned incomes – on which contributions are higher than 
on benefits – increases according to the income decile. 
The highest deciles therefore pay, on average, the highest 
social contributions, and that augments the redistributive 
effect.
In the case of self-employed workers, the social contribu-
tions are degressive, moderating somewhat the progres-
siveness of social contributions overall.
4.1  The special social security contribution
The  special  social  security  contribution  was  introduced 
in  1994  and  applies  to  all  employed  persons,  whether 
employees or civil servants. Households whose members 
are entirely self-employed do not pay this contribution. 
This contribution is unique in being levied on the basis of 
the net taxable income of the household.
No special contribution is payable if the household’s net 
taxable income is less than 18,92 euro per annum. For 
incomes  between  18,92  and  21,071  euro,  the  rate 
increases to 9 p.c. It then drops to 1.3 p.c. for incomes 
between 21,071 and 60,162 euros. There is a zero mar-
ginal rate applicable to incomes of over 60,162 euro, 
so that the maximum contribution is 731 euro. Despite 
this limit and the fact that the marginal rates decline 
as income increases, this contribution is more progres-
sive than personal income tax. The reason is that low 
incomes are exempt because of the lower limit already 
mentioned.  No  special  social  security  contribution  is 
payable up to the fifth income decile. This contribution 
(1)  This analysis takes no account of employers’ contributions.
(2)  For statutory civil servants, who are not employed in a local public service, the 
personal social contributions amount to 11.0 p.c.76
to rise gradually to 13.07 p.c., up to the pay level at which 
the work bonus ceases to apply.
The redistribution implications of the work bonus are dif-
ferent from those of the systems which it replaced, such 
as  the  reductions  in  personal  contributions  introduced 
on  1  January  2000  and  the  tax  credit  for  low  earned 
incomes. This last measure was aimed almost exclusively 
at employees being paid an amount close to the minimum 
wage, but part-timers were often also eligible. In contrast, 
the work bonus is aimed at both full-time and part-time 
workers receiving wages which – though low – are signifi-
cantly higher than the minimum wage. For incomes close 
to the minimum wage, the change is neutral and has no 
effect  on  net  income.  Employees  being  paid  less  than 
the minimum wage – mainly part-time workers – incur a 
loss. The main advantage of the change is conferred on 
employees receiving an income in excess of the minimum 
wage.
4.3    Social contributions payable by self-employed 
workers
In contrast to the system for employees, the social con-
tributions  payable  by  self-employed  workers  are  clearly 
degressive.  In  2006,  the  rate  of  19.6  p.c.  applies  to 
incomes up to 47,203 euro, with a minimum of 47 euro 
per quarter. On incomes between 47,203 and 69,68 euro,   
the  rate  of  social  contributions  is  14.16  p.c.,  while  no 
(1)  This figure applies to non-manual workers ; for manual workers, the maximum 
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CHART 12  AVERAGE RATE OF PERSONAL SOCIAL 
SECURITY CONTRIBUTIONS AFTER APPLICATION 



























CHART 11  THE SPECIAL SOCIAL SECURITY CONTRIBUTION 
BY INCOME DECILE
 
(2002 incomes, 2003 tax year)
Source : FPS Finance.
Income decile
Taxable income
Special social security contribution
Personal income tax
becomes  particularly  significant  from  the  seventh  to 
the ninth income decile, while the ceiling applies to the 
tenth decile.
4.2  Work bonus
The work bonus is a reduction in personal social security 
contributions granted to low wage earners and certain 
workers  affected  by  corporate  restructuring.  For  the   
year 2006, the maximum reduction in personal contribu-
tions granted by means of the work bonus was increased 
to  140  euro  per  month  (1).  This  maximum  is  granted 
to  workers  earning  a  gross  monthly  income  of  up  to   
1,234  euro.  For  incomes  in  excess  of  that  figure,  the 
work bonus gradually declines to zero at the point where 
monthly income equals 2,036 euro. For part-time workers, 
the maximum amount and the wage ceilings are adjusted 
proportionately according to their working hours.
As a result of the work bonus, employees receiving the 
minimum wage do not in practice pay any personal con-
tributions. In the case of slightly higher incomes, the work 
bonus causes the average rates of personal contributions 77
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contributions are payable on incomes above that level. 
Owing to the structure of self-employed workers’ contri-
butions, the average rate is high initially, on account of 
the minimum contributions, before equalling the marginal 
rate of 19.6 p.c. Beyond the income levels subject to the 
marginal rates of 14.16 p.c. and 0 p.c., there is a gradual 
decline in the average rate.
.    The redistributive character of 
indirect taxes
The redistributive character of indirect taxes is examined 
on the basis of the household budget survey conducted in 
2001 by the Directorate-general Statistics of FPS Economy. 
That survey gives average household spending figures  (1), 
for the various expenditure categories, per income decile. 
There are over 800 expenditure categories altogether. The 
redistributive effects of VAT and excise duties are exam-
ined on the basis of both the expenditure profile of the 
various income deciles and the percentage represented by 
VAT or excise duty in the average price for each expendi-
ture category in 2001  (2).
.1  VAT and excise duties in Belgium
Belgium applies various rates of VAT. Thus, certain goods 
and services, such as daily papers, rents and school fees, 
are de facto subject to a zero rate. A reduced rate of 
VAT – 6 p.c. – generally applies to basic products such 
as most food products, water consumption, magazines 
and books, hotel or camp site accommodation, sporting 
and cultural activities, passenger transport and renovation 
work on residential property which is at least fifteen years 
old (temporarily applicable to residential property which is 
at least five years old). Next, there is an intermediate rate 
(1)  The data were adjusted for household size on the basis of the equivalence scales 
used by the OECD.
(2)  In the case of excise duties, this analysis was only possible for mineral oils and 
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CHART 13  REDISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS OF THE WORK BONUS
  (in euro)
Source : NBB.














































































CHART 14  AVERAGE AND MARGINAL RATES OF SOCIAL 






of 12 p.c. which applies only to margarine, coal and cable 
television. The standard rate of 21 p.c. applies to all other 
product  categories.  Products  not  explicitly  specified  as 
attracting a lower rate are subject to this 21 p.c. rate  (1).
The rates of excise duties levied on mineral oils, tobacco 
products and beverages vary widely. Thus, in 2001 the 
excise  duty  on  one  thousand  litres  of  petrol  was  over 
200 euro more than the amount charged on the same 
quantity of diesel. Excise duties represented 47 p.c. and 
3  p.c.  respectively  of  the  selling  price  of  petrol  and 
diesel. In Belgium, unlike in most EU-1 countries, only 
a small amount of duty is levied on heating oil ; in 2001, 
excise duty represented only 4 p.c. of the selling price. 
Conversely,  the  excise  duty  on  a  packet  of  cigarettes 
averaged 2 euro in 2004, corresponding to 7 p.c. of the 
average selling price of 3. euro.
.2  Value added tax
The most significant indirect tax from the point of view of 
the budget is VAT, which raised the equivalent of 7 p.c. of 
GDP in 200. The breakdown of VAT between households 
was simulated on the basis of the expenditure categories 
in  the  household  budget  survey  and  the  rates  of  VAT. 
The total simulated VAT corresponds to around 70 p.c. of 
the actual VAT received by general government in 2001. 
The difference in relation to actual VAT revenues is due 
mainly to certain firms, the liberal professions and certain 
bodies such as local authorities being unable to recover 
any VAT, and to the expenditure effected in Belgium by 
non-residents. The simulated VAT totals 9.6 p.c. in relation 
to household expenditure and 8.6 p.c. of total disposable 
income.
The  pattern  of  household  consumption  varies  according 
to the income decile. In proportion to their expenditure, 
the lower income groups consume relatively more of the 
products which are subject to the reduced rate of 6 p.c. 
or those which are exempt from VAT  (2). The level of con-
sumption of products subject to the 6 p.c. reduced rate 
falls from 19 p.c. in the first income decile to 13 p.c. in the 
last income decile. The expenditure to which the zero rate 
applies – particularly rental charges  (3) – drops from 41 p.c. 
in the first decile to 31 p.c. in the tenth decile. The propor-
tion represented by the 12 p.c. rate is negligible, at 2 p.c., 
and remains constant across all income deciles. The propor-
tion of expenditure subject to the residual rate of 21 p.c.   
increases  sharply  across  the  income  deciles,  rising  from   
39 p.c. in the first decile to 4 p.c. in the tenth decile.
(1)  Apart from the rates mentioned above, there is also a 1 p.c. rate applicable to 
transactions in non-monetary gold.
(2)  In the literature, this aspect is known as “Engel’s law”. As income increases, the 
relative importance of expenditure on basic essentials such as food declines.
(3)  For home owners, the household budget survey also takes account of imputed 
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CHART 15  REDISTRIBUTIVE CHARACTER OF VAT
Sources : FPS Economy, NBB.
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Owing to the pattern of household consumption and the 
diversity of tax rates, the simulated VAT is progressive in 
relation to household expenditure. It rises steadily from   
8 p.c. in the lowest income decile to 10.2 p.c. in the tenth 
income decile.
In  proportion  to  disposable  income,  VAT  is  decidedly 
degressive. It declines from 10.2 p.c. in the first decile to 
7.2 p.c. in the tenth decile. However, its degressive char-
acter is particularly marked in the first and tenth deciles, 
since there is only a gradual decline in the proportion of 
VAT between the second and ninth deciles, down from 
9. to 8. p.c.
The  degressivity  of  indirect  taxes  in  relation  to  income 
is due to the fact that indirect taxes are levied only on 
household consumption and not on income saved. The 
consumption of households with the lowest disposable 
income is about 27 p.c. greater than their income. In the 
fifth income decile, consumption and disposable income 
are  in  overall  balance.  In  contrast,  the  highest  decile 
spends on average only 70 p.c. of its income on consump-
tion, saving the remainder  (1).
.3  Excise duties
Simulated excise duties represent 1.4 p.c. of disposable 
income. In 2001, these simulated excise duties totalled 
only 40 p.c. of the excise duties actually collected. This 
small proportion is due to the large amount of excise duty 
on diesel, petrol and heating oil, paid to general govern-
ment by firms. Also, the simulation could not include the 
excise duty on (alcoholic) beverages, since the rates appli-
cable vary greatly and the information obtained from the 
household budget survey is not sufficiently specific.
There are wide variations in the relative importance of the 
various expenditure categories on which excise duties are 
levied. Expenditure on petrol and diesel is proportionally 
more significant in the intermediate income deciles, where 
it represents just over 3 p.c. of expenditure. The share of 
expenditure on heating oil declines considerably between 
the first and tenth deciles, dropping from 2. p.c. to 0.8 p.c.   
The proportion of expenditure on tobacco products falls 
sharply across the income deciles, dropping from 1.9 p.c. 
in the first decile to 0.4 p.c. in the tenth.
Unlike  VAT  payments,  for  wich  the  relative  importance 
increases in proportion of consumption, excise duties do 
not present a clear pattern. In relation to income, excise 
duties are degressive, but this finding is due essentially to 
(1)  The choice between the two measures – in relation to the expenditure of the 
disposable income of households – is not straightforward. Expenditure may in 
fact be regarded as a better indicator of household prosperity than income, 
which is volatile (De Coster, 199).




























CHART 16  REDISTRIBUTIVE CHARACTER OF EXCISE DUTIES
Sources : FPS Economy, NBB.
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the first and last deciles. The profile is similar in relation 
to household expenditure, but is less marked. In terms of 
consumption, the excise duties on petrol and diesel are 
progressive up to the seventh decile and then become 
degressive.  Since  heating  oil  is  subject  to  only  a  very 
low level of excise duty in Belgium, that duty has little 
influence on the household budget  (1), even though the 
percentage  of  expenditure  devoted  to  heating  oil  falls 
sharply  across  the  income  deciles.  The  excise  duty  on 
tobacco is the main reason for the degressive character 
of excise duties as a whole in proportion to income. The 
recent increases in the excise duty on tobacco reinforced 
that degressivity.
Excise duties are levied on products whose consumption 
the  government  aims  to  discourage  because  they  are 
harmful either to health, such as tobacco and alcohol, 
or to the environment as in the case of petrol and diesel. 
The  government  therefore  considers  the  redistributive 
character of excise duties to be less important than their 
dissuasive effect.
.4    The redistributive character of VAT and excise 
duties
Overall,  VAT  and  excise  duties  are  therefore  neutral  or 
even slightly progressive in relation to household expendi-
ture. However, in relation to household incomes they are 
clearly degressive.
Conclusions
Compared to the other EU-1 countries, Belgium has less 
primary income inequality. Moreover, there is a relatively 
high degree of redistribution in Belgium, so that – after 
taxes,  social  benefits  and  social  security  contributions 
– the disparities are among the smallest in Europe. As 
in other countries, this income redistribution is effected 
primarily  via  social  benefits.  However,  redistribution  via 
taxation also plays a very important role.
The most strongly redistributive tax in Belgium is personal 
income tax, which is highly progressive. That is due prin-
cipally to the structure of the tax scales and the amount 
of the tax-free allowance, and to the reduction in taxes 
on replacement incomes. The influence of social security 
contributions on the redistribution of income is relatively 
limited, although it is greater than in the majority of the 
EU-1 countries.
VAT,  which  accounts  for  the  bulk  of  indirect  taxes,  is 
slightly progressive in relation to expenditure, owing to 
the rate structure whereby the reduced rate and the zero 
rate  apply  to  goods  and  services  which  are  consumed 
to a proportionally greater extent by low-income house-
holds. Conversely, in relation to disposable income, VAT 
is degressive. That is because the savings ratio increases 
with each income decile. Excise duties are rather degres-
sive, in relation to both household spending and house-
hold income.
This study also illustrates the fact that tax measures are 
seldom neutral in their effect on income redistribution. 
However, this effect is clearly dependent on the practical 
arrangements  of  these  measures.  The  personal  income 
tax  reform  approved  in  2001  and  the  introduction  of 
the work bonus increased the progressive effect of the 
compulsory  levies  on  earned  income  and  reduced  the 
average rate of the levy. While the impact of increases in 
excise duties on fuel is more mixed in terms of redistribu-
tion, the recent increases in excise duty on tobacco have 
accentuated their degressive character. However, it is clear 
that the government also uses excise duties as an instru-
ment  to  discourage  unhealthy  or  ecologically  unsound 
consumption behaviour.
(1)  However, it should be noted that heating oil is subject to 21 p.c. VAT.



















CHART 17  REDISTRIBUTIVE CHARACTER OF VAT AND 
EXCISE DUTIES
Sources : FPS Economy, NBB.
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